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The current challenges of money laundering law in Russia 
1. Abstract  
Globalization has turned the international financial systems into a paradise for money 
launderers. As much as globalization has expanded opportunities as never before, but, this 
expansion of opportunities has also resulted in new risks. Globalization has facilitated the move 
of billions of dollars a year by money launderers. This unexpected consequence of globalization 
presents serious challenges for legislators.   
The new law on combating money laundering which brought some changes to the existing 
system was introduced in Russia in 2002. Even though it has improved greatly the regulation 
on money laundering, it has failed to efficiently combat terrorism. Overall, the Russian anti-
money laundering regime has proved ineffective in terms of meeting its stated purposes of 
combating organized crime and terrorism. The limited success of the Russian anti-money 
laundering law stems largely from the fact that Russian banking system is structurally weak. 
The other main reason is the lack of regulatory compliance culture within the industry, 
weakening the effect of the law itself. 
This paper starts from the premise that Russian made great effort to comply with international 
recommendations but that its law fails to efficiently deal with terrorism finance partly due to 
the fact that no consensus exists at international level as to the definition of the terrorism. 
Furthermore, the doubt persists as to the real aim pursued by Russian government while 
enacting the money laundering law.  
 
2. Introduction  
Globalization has turned the international financial systems into a paradise for money 
launderers. Indeed, globalization enhances the international integration of capital, technology, 
and information in a manner resulting in a single global market.1 As much as globalization has 
expanded opportunities as never before, but, this expansion of opportunities has also resulted 
in new risks. Globalization has facilitated the move of billions of dollars a year by money 
launderers. This unexpected consequence of globalization presents serious challenges for 
legislators.   
The new law on combating money laundering which brought some changes to the existing 
system was introduced in Russia in 2002. Even though it has improved greatly the regulation 
on money laundering, it has failed to efficiently combat terrorism. Overall, the Russian anti-
money laundering regime has proved ineffective in terms of meeting its stated purposes of 
combating organized crime and terrorism. The limited success of the Russian anti-money 
laundering law stems largely from the fact that Russian banking system is structurally weak. 
The other main reason is the lack of regulatory compliance culture within the industry, 
weakening the effect of the law itself.  
Russian authorities have been criticized for opportunistically having used the anti-money 
laundering regime as a tool to reform the banking system, which is an unconnected end to the 
 
1 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization(New York, NY: Farrar, Straus, 
Giroux,1999) 
fight against terrorism and organized crimes.2 As a result, the effectiveness of the money 
laundering regulations is undermined. Moreover, by using the regulation to achieve different 
aims, the legitimacy of the whole system is put at stake.  
This paper starts from the premise that Russian made great effort to comply with international 
recommendations. The country has enacted laws to regulate money laundering at national level. 
But has failed to enact laws that are dealing with terrorism finance. The doubt persists as to the 
real aim pursued by Russian government while enacting the money laundering law. This paper 
will examine the current challenges that Russian law is facing. Part one will briefly summarize 
the problem that money laundering possesses worldwide. The rational for regulating money 
laundering will be given. Within part two that is dedicated to Russia, first a brief summary of 
money laundering in Russia will be given. Then, the focus will shift to the specific Russian 
laws on money laundering, especially the money laundering law of 2001 which will be 
discussed in length. Finally, with regard to Russia, the current challenges will be examined, 
with an emphasis on terrorism, the banking system and lack of compliance culture.  
 
3. Money laundering a worldwide problem with worldwide solutions  
Money laundering started to be seen as a serious problem during the US war on drugs. Indeed, 
as Raymond Kelly, Commissioner of the US Customs Service, stated, "we will not win the war 
on drugs by following the tons of cocaine and heroin and marijuana that move through our 
streets. We will win it by following the billions of drug dollars that move through our financial 
system."3 With the US war on drugs, the international community started to realise that some 
of the greatest problems of our century should be combatted at the root of the problem in order 
to have a long-term effect. This focus on money laundering and later on terrorist financing have 
motivated significant international cooperation, sometimes even involuntary cooperation.4 
Many countries have adopted an American style of anti-money laundering regulations, 
rendering the combat increasingly homogenized.5 This American influence is best exemplified 
by the fact that the international cooperation in the fight against money laundering and terrorist 
financing is ensured by the US-run FATF. The non-cooperative countries and territories 
(NCCT) project which created "blacklists" of countries that failed to regulate money laundering 
set by FATF, was commenced by FATF.6 Interestingly ‘[...] although the basis for the FATF is 
not a binding international treaty but an agreement, it had provided the basis for an embryonic 
system to police the behavior of countries, including both members and non-members’.7 
Indeed, these blacklists have serious repercussions, as often foreign economic aid and foreign 
 
2 Alexandra V. Orlova, ‘Russia's anti-money laundering regime: law enforcement tool or instrument of domestic 
control?’ (2008) 11 Journal of Money Laundering Control 210 
3 Beare, M.E., "Searching for wayward dollars: money laundering or tax evasion -- which dollars are we really 
after?", (2002) 9 Journal of Financial Crime, p. 259 
4 Beare, (n 2); Gilligan, G.P., Regulating the Financial Services Sector, (The Hague, 1999), p. 22; Naylor, R.T, 
"Follow-the-money methods in crime control policy", in Beare, M.E. (Ed.), Critical Re-flections on Transnational 
Organized Crime, Money Laundering, and Corruption, (University of Toronto Press, 2003) pp. 262-7 
5 Cuellar, M-F., "Criminal law: the tenuous relationship between the fight against money laundering and the 
disruptions of criminal finance", (2003) Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 93, p. 376; Orlova (n 1), p.211 
6 Eizenstat, S.E. (2001), "Congressional Hearing on the (USA) Administration's 'National Money Laundering 
Strategy for 2001'", A testimony on 26 September 2001, available at: <www.fas.org/irp/congress/2001_hr/092601-
eizenstat.html> (last visited 20 August 2016). 
7 Cuellar (n 4), p. 377 
capitals are withdrawn from that country. This, in turn, leads to a general slowdown of all 
financial transactions and destabilisation of the country’s financial system, as foreign banks 
treated transactions coming from a country on the blacklist as suspicious.8 
As Cuellar has noted ‘[...] the fight against money laundering is designed not just to punish a 
few people who happen to get caught with money after committing a crime, but to punish 
instead the larger infrastructure that allows domestic and global criminal networks to profit 
from and finance crime.’9 Targeting money laundering is, therefore, a vital tool in helping the 
authorities to disrupt the financing of criminal activities.  
Regulating money laundering has a direct impact on the state itself, as it preserves the integrity 
and stability of the financial system.10 Moreover, in a sense money laundering is undermining 
the power of the state as capitals from illicit origins penetrate domestic financial systems.11 
However, sometimes at national level, governments enact anti-money laundering regulations in 
order to pursue broader goals. Russia is a vivid example of such a use of the regulation to pursue 
unrelated goals.12 
4. Russia 
a. Money laundering in Russia 
The increased attention given to money laundering at international level have led to an increased 
attention given to Russia, alongside with an increase international pressure. Russia has faced 
enormous international pressure to bring its anti-money laundering regime into compliance with 
the Recommendations issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Indeed, Russian law 
was outdated and was not able to cope with the new international reality anymore. Part of the 
pressure arose in response to investigation that was reported in the American press in 1999. 
These reports claimed that more than US $4 billion had been laundered through an account in 
the Bank of New York (BONY), coming from Russian organised crime. After a larger 
investigation, the amount was raised to between US$7 and 10 billion.13 During the trial, the 
former BONY Senior Vice President, Lucy Edwards, and her husband Peter Berlin pleaded 
guilty to various charges including money laundering.14 Interestingly, the Russian authorities 
refused to make the results of their investigation on the BONY scandal public.15 Therefore, it 
remains a doubt as to the amount of capitals that was laundered coming from Russia.16 This 
 
8 Levi, M. "Controlling the international money trail: a multi-level cross-national public policy review", (2003) 
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9 Cuellar (n 4), p. 324 
10 Johnson, J. and Lim, Y.C.D., "Money laundering: has the financial actions task force made a difference?", (2002) 
10 Journal of Financial Crime 1, p.7 
11 Favarel-Garrigues, G., Domestic Reformulation of the Moral Issues at Stake in the Drive against Money 
Laundering: The Case of Russia, UNESCO, (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005), p. 530  
12 Favarel-Garrigues (n 10), p. 538-9 
13 Robinson, P.L. and Burger, E.S., "The regulatory framework and potential implications of the Bank of New 
York money-laundering scandal for Russia and the United States", Russia Business Watch, 1999/2000 
14 O'Brien, T.L., "Respite for bank of New York, then back in thicket", The New York Times, 18 February 2000, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/18/world/respite-for-bank-of-new-york-then-back-in-thicket.html> (last 
visited on 20 August 2016); Neumeister, L., Ex-bank Exec, Husband Plead Guilty in Russian Money Case, The 
Associated Press, London, 16 February 2000. 
15 Orlova (n 1), p.212 
16 Robinson and Burger (n 12) 
scandal shook the US and brought up a fear of a Russian organised crime menace.17 
Furthermore, the scandal led to more pressure on Russia to pass legislation in line with the Forty 
Recommendations of FATF.   
Even though they complied with this demand and enacted legislation more in line with the 
FATF standards, Russia has been strongly criticised for the way it uses money laundering 
regulation to pursue various domestic political aims, such as reforming the banking industry, 
controlling political activists or even controlling the business community.18 
 
b. The regulation of money laundering 
Since 9/11, measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing have become 
increasingly harmonised across jurisdictions. However, as will be argued later, without an 
international uniform definition and international measures, national measures are just of 
temporary help. As mentioned above, Russia has been subject to intense international pressure 
to bring its anti-money laundering regime into compliance with the Recommendations issued 
by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Indeed, Russian law was outdated and was no 
more able to cope with the new international reality.  
 
i. The old regime 
Prior to the reform of Russia’s money laundering regime, money laundering was rudimentarily 
addressed in Article 174 of the Criminal Code. The Criminal Code was the first post-Soviet 
Criminal Code and was adopted by the State on 24 May 1996, approved by the Federation 
Council on 5 June 1996, and signed by the President on 13 June 1996. It officially entered into 
force on 1 January 1997.19 The old Article 174 was written in very broad terms leading to 
confusion over its scope of application. This confusion was also seen in the judgments of the 
courts, that avoided going out of their comfort zone and ended just convicting minor civil 
offenders of money laundering.20 
Due to the external pressure, on 1 February 2002, the anti-money laundering legislation, 
officially called the legislation on Countermeasures Against Legalization (Laundering) of 
Proceeds from Crime, entered into force.21 This law incorporated many of the FATF’s 1996 
recommendations as well as the most important provisions of the Strasbourg Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime of 1990. 
Additionally, the legislation on Amendments and Additions to Legislation of the Russian 
Federation in Connection with the Adoption of the Federal Law on Counter-measures Against 
Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds from Crime was enacted simultaneously. This particular 
piece of legislation amended, amongst other sections, Article 174 of the Criminal Code in order 
to bring this provision in line with the new anti-money laundering regime. Article 174 was 
 
17 Manney, R., "Money-laundering: the global threat to the integrity of financial systems", (2002) available at: 
<www.wilmott.com> (last visited on 20 August 2016), p.3 
18 Favarel-Garrigues (n 10), p. 539 
19 Butler, W.E. (Ed.), Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, (Simmonds & Hill Publishing Ltd, 1997), p.2 
20 Orlova (n 1), p.213 
21 European Commission for Democracy through law, ‘Federal law on combating extremist activity of the Russian 
Federation’, Opinion no. 660 / 2011, 2012.  
further amended by the Federal Law entitled on Additions and Amendments to the Criminal 
Code of the Russian Federation No. 162-FZ, which entered in force on 11 December 2003.22 
 
ii. The federal Law 'on Combating Money Laundering' of 2001 
One of the most important piece of legislation regarding money laundering in Russia is the 
federal Law 'on Combating Money Laundering'. The federal Law 'on Combating Money 
Laundering' or also referred to as the 'Money Laundering Law', dated from 13 July 2001 and 
was signed by the President Vladimir Putin on 7 August 2001. The money laundering law came 
into force on 1 February 2002. The money laundering law mostly follows the recommendations 
made by the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, an inter-governmental body 
having as its main goal the developing and promoting of policies to combat money laundering 
at national level.  
Before the money laundering law, the definition of money laundering was vague, leading to 
confusion. The new law clarified some basic principles in the definition of money laundering. 
Since the definition was changed, there was a need to amend the Criminal Code to reflect those 
changes.  The amended Criminal Code defines money laundering as follows: 'the conclusion of 
financial operations and other transactions with money or other property on a large scale, 
knowingly obtained by criminal means (excepting crimes under arts 193, 194, 198 and 199 of 
the Russian Criminal Code) for the purpose of giving lawful character to ownership, usage and 
disposal of the indicated money or other property'. The old Article 174 of the Criminal Code 
only referred in very broad and general terms to an illegal source of money. Such broad 
definition caused problems as legally earned funds which had been wrongfully retained through 
tax evasion or obtained in contravention of currency control legislation, for example tax or 
currency control violations, were falling under the term money laundering. As a result, the old 
s.174 was mainly criticised for the confusion over its scope of application that existed.23  
The new definition, however, is more narrow and only refers to a criminal source of money, 
therefore making it clear that only earning derived exclusively from criminal activities leads to 
money laundering. As a result, crimes such as the non-return of funds in foreign currency from 
abroad or evasion of liability to pay taxes and insurance premiums to the state are exempted. 
With the money laundering law, Russian law is more in line with international standards. In 
practice, the changes brought by the money laundering law means that a who fails to pay taxes 
can only be held liable for tax evasion and not for money laundering. Tax evasion cannot itself 
convert lawfully earned funds into funds derived from criminal means. 
Since the old definition in Article 174 was so broad, courts tended to concentrate on minor 
offenders having obtained funds from committing civil or administrative crimes rather than 
criminal offences. As a direct result, until the money laundering law, there has been only few 
convictions. In 1999, there were only 105 convictions related to money laundering in the whole 
 
22 "O Vnesenii Izmenenii I Dopolnenii v Ugolovnyi Kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (in Russian), Federal law 
numero No. 162-FZ 
23 Alexandra V. Orlova, ‘Russia's anti-money laundering regime: law enforcement tool or instrument of domestic 
control?’ (2008) 11 Journal of Money Laundering Control 210, p.213 
Russia. Most of their offenses were minor.24 With the new law, this changes as in order to be 
convicted of money laundering, the person needs to have committed a crime.  
In order to effectively combat money laundering, the money laundering law requires any cash 
or deposit transactions involving over 600,000 Roubles (approximately US$20,000) to be 
reported to a central executive agency, the Federal Financial Monitoring Service which is 
Russia's Financial Intelligence Unit.25 The same holds true for any kind of transaction deemed 
suspicious and suspected of having a link with a criminal activity. Real estate transactions are 
not included in this provision.26 However, if one of the parties to the transaction is identified as 
participating in extremist activities, it can either be a person or an organization, then such 
transaction must be reported to the Federal Financial Monitoring Service, regardless of the 
amount involved. The same holds true if one of the parties is controlled or under the influence 
of an organisation or individual listed as participating in extremist activities.27 
Financial institutions have a prevalent role to play under the money laundering law. Indeed, 
financial institutions are required to supervise and report any suspicious transaction, which is a 
mandatory reporting requirement embodied in Article 5. In addition to that, the institutions, 
conducting transactions with money, are obliged to keep internal record and have customer 
identification procedures. The institutions are required to develop internal control measures 
mechanisms that effectively combat money laundering. Confidentiality and staff training is also 
another important requirement. But the most important is that the internal control measure must 
establish criteria to identify suspicious transaction.28 The rules governing a financial 
institution's internal record keeping and reporting of suspicious transactions include an 
obligation to perform increased due diligence on all complex or unusual patterns of transactions 
which have no apparent economic or lawful purpose.29 Regardless of whether the transaction 
is subject to mandatory reporting, if the result of an internal control raise a suspicion as to the 
real aim of the transaction, the financial organization must report such suspicious activity.30 
The institution has a relatively short time frame for reporting, as it is allowed only one working 
day after the transaction was made or after the result of the control has demonstrated a 
suspicious transaction.31 
The meaning of financial institution is not limited to banks but also includes securities market 
professionals, insurance and leasing companies and other non-credit organisations which deal 
with the transmission of money. The law has a really brought scope and includes also real estate 
agencies, lawyers, notaries and companies providing legal and accounting services.32 The 
financial institutions are protected for any liability resulting from a breach of any restriction on 
disclosure of information imposed by the money laundering law. Indeed, the financial 
institution is under no obligation to warn its customers that the institution transferred 
 
24 European Committee on Crime Problems (CDCP), ‘Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of An-ti-
Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV) (2003), First evaluation report on the Russian Federation’,  (2003) 
available at: www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Legal-co-operation/Combating_economic_crime (accessed July 
2016). 
25 Article 6 
26 Max Gutbrod and Alexander Titov, ‘Russia: New Money Laundering Law’ (2002) 7 JIBFL 304 
27 Article 6(2)  
28 Article 7(2) 
29  Article 7(1)(3) 
30 Article 7 (3) 
31 Article 7(1)(4) in conjunction with Article 7(3). 
32 Article 5 
information relating to the customer’s account to the competent authorities. Financial 
institutions must know the actual identity of their customers and are not allowed to open or 
keep anonymously held accounts, as it was previously the case. The organization has the right 
to refuse to open an account on two grounds; first if the person or the legal entity wanting to 
open the account fail to submit the adequate information which would identify the customer. 
Second, if information regarding the activity of the person as participating in terrorist activities 
exists.33 
The records of suspicious transactions subject to mandatory reporting and customers suspected 
of suspicious transaction must be kept by the institution for at least five years.34 Moreover, the 
financial institution can suspend debit operation for two working days. Then the Federal 
Financial Monitoring Service has the authority to suspend financial transactions for a further 
five working days if the suspicions are well grounded.35 Russian government will draw up a 
blacklist of non-co-operative jurisdictions, which will correspondingly bear special scrutiny 
upon report of any suspicious transactions.  
Following the measure already taken by a number of other countries, a specialized 
governmental agency, internationally known as financial intelligence units or FIU, will be 
created to handle money laundering issues. The Russian FIU will be a central federal agency 
responsible for the receiving, reviewing and analyzing of information received. When the 
information is of relevance, the FIU will transfer it to the competent authorities concerning 
suspected money laundering activities. Moreover, the FIU will cooperate with the competent 
foreign authorities, under the relevant international agreements. The major areas where such 
cooperation will take place are the areas of collection and exchange of information, 
investigation of cases send by foreign authorities and enforcement of foreign court decisions. 
The sharing of confiscated property with other countries, is possible, certainly when the 
confiscation is the result of a joint case among these countries. 
However, with the FATF's 2003 Recommendations it soon started to be obvious that the 
amendments were not sufficient. As a result, the money laundering legislation underwent 
further amendments during the years that followed its enactment.36 Certainly so, since the first 
version of the law did not include terrorist financing and therefore was viewed as outdated as 
international terrorism was rising.  
iii. Criminal code   
In the current version of the Criminal Code, there are provisions to deal with both professional 
money laundering as well as self-laundering. Article 174 paragraph 1 focus on third party 
laundering, meaning laundering of money from criminal activities by persons that are not 
involved in the commission of the crime. Such offence is punished by a fine amounting to up 
to 120,000 Roubles or an amount equivalent to the amount of the earnings or other revenue of 
the convicted person for a period of up to one year. It reads as follows: “Legalization 
 
33 Article 7(5)  
34 Article 7(4)  
35 Article 8 
36 Federal Law No. 115, as amended by Federal Law No. 112-FZ, from 25 July 2002, as further amended by the 
Federal Law No. 131-FZ, from 30 October 2002, as further amended by the Federal Law No. 88-FZ, from 28 
July 2004 
(Laundering) of Monetary Means or Other Property Acquired by Other Persons by Criminal 
Means:  
“1.     The performance of financial operations and other transactions with monetary 
means or other property known to have been acquired by other persons by criminal 
means (with the exception of of-fences defined in sections 193, 194, 198, 199, 199.1 
and 199.2 of this Code) for the purpose of giving a legal appearance to the possession, 
use and control of such monetary means or other property.”  
Self-laundering is also included. Self-laundering is when the perpetrator of the offence launders 
the money coming from his own criminal offence. Article 174.1 (1) reads as follows: “1. The 
performance of financial operations and other transactions with monetary means or other 
property acquired by a person as a result of a person committing a crime (with the exception of 
offences defined in sections 193, 194, 198, 199, 199.1 and 199.2 of this Code) or the use of 
such monetary means or other property in order to effectuate entrepreneurial or other economic 
activity.” Such crime is punished by a fine amounting to up to 120,000 Roubles or an amount 
equivalent to the amount of the earnings or other revenue of the convicted person for a period 
of up to one year.  
A common feature of both paragraphs is that they exclude the same type of offences. Indeed, 
the sections listed as excluded are sections about tax evasion. Section 193 refers to the failure 
to return means in foreign currency from abroad, while section 194 focuses on evasion of 
customs payments. Section 198 refers to tax evasion by citizens while section 199 focuses on 
tax evasion by organisations.  The failure to carry out the duties of a tax agent is laid down in 
section 199.1, while concealment of monetary means or property of an organisation or an 
individual entrepreneur that is subject to taxation and/or collection, is dealt with in section 
199.2. However, if the offences listed in one of these sections is combined with another criminal 
offence, such as forgery or fraud, then the person will still be convicted of money laundering.37 
The exclusion of these offences has been strongly criticised, since these offences generate large 
profits.38 
1. The court practice  
Courts applied Article 174 and 174.1 inconsistently. As a result, in 2004, the Supreme Court of 
Russia issued guiding instructions to be followed uniformly throughout the country by the lower 
courts, for money laundering cases.39 The Supreme Court noted the difference between Article 
174 and 174.1. Indeed, in Article 174 (1) there is a sentence, ‘legal appearance to the possession, 
use and control of monetary means or other property, acquired as a result of criminal activity’, 
which is absent from Article 174.1(1).  
The Supreme Court also highlighted the inconsistency between the wording of Article 174.1 
and Article 3 of the money laundering law which defines the term laundering as "giving a legal 
appearance to the possession, use and control of monetary means or other property, acquired as 
a result of criminal activity", using the same wording as in Article 174(1).  
 
37 Schaer, M, ‘New Russian money laundering legislation’, (2001) 29 International Business Lawyer, p.370 
38 Sher, O., ‘Breaking the wash cycle: new money laundering laws in Russia’, (2003) 22 New York Law School 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 640, p.643 
39 Guiding Instructions No. 23, from 18 November 2004 
The guiding instruction also raised the mens rea of the third-party offender. Indeed, in order for 
a third party to escape liability, it must be demonstrated to the court with sufficient evidence 
that the third party knew, and not should have known, that the money that he was laundering 
came from criminal activities. Such higher mens rea standard makes it easier to be escaped as 
recklessness is not enough to convict the person of money laundering under Article 174(1).40 
In the eyes of the Supreme Court, simply disposing of a property acquired as a result of a crime 
should not be considered as laundering, as long as there was no intent to make the property 
appeared as legitimate.  Another common mistake made by the lower courts included 
classifying rent payments and food purchases made with money derived from criminal activities 
as money laundering, when no attempts were made to give legitimate appearance to the money 
of these criminal activities. It even went to the point where someone was accused of money 
laundering for purchasing food worth 20 Roubles, which is equal to less than $1US.41 
As Orlova stated: ‘The actual numbers of money laundering prosecutions under these two 
Criminal Code provisions are relatively small. For instance, in 2001 under s.174 (third-party 
laundering), there were 73 convictions; in 2002 -- 27 convictions; and in 2003 -- 11 convictions. 
Three individuals were convicted under s.174.1 (self-laundering) in 2003. All these individuals 
received suspended sentences (Supreme Court's Bulletin, 2005b). According to MVD statistics, 
in 2004 the number of convictions for both ss.174 and 174.1 rose to 85; in 2005 to 238; and in 
2006 to 1,824’.42 It can be noticed that, after the 2004 reform of the Criminal Code, the number 
of convictions for money laundering has dramatically increased. Indeed, the amendments made 
to the Criminal Code eliminate the requirement of large-scale money laundering for both 
articles. Until 2004, convictions were only made for large scale money laundering.43 
Still ‘Overall, the number of offences registered under s.174.1 (self-laundering) far exceeds 
those registered under s.174 (third-party laundering). For example, in 2005 police registered 
524 offences under s.174 and 6,937 offences under s.174.1, for a total of 238 convictions 
overall’.44 This shows the tendency of the courts to prosecute self-laundering instead of third-
party laundering, meaning that these prosecutions are linked with other offences rather than just 
than the commission of economic crimes. ‘A review of cases involving organised crime charges 
further reveals that only very few of them involved charges of money laundering as well. Hence, 
it appears that the Russian courts, for the most part, do not prosecute cases connected with 
professional laundering involving organised criminal entities’.45  
c. The current challenges  
Surprisingly, in a few year period, Russia has gone from being on the FATF's "blacklist" of 
non-compliant countries to becoming a full-fledged member of the FATF, adopting the 
international recommendation and adapting it to its own anti-money laundering regime. 
However, doubts persist as to the effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures as tools to 
stop the spread of terrorism and organised crimes. Certainly so when some have started to show 
mistrust as to the real aims pursued by the Russian government.  
 
40 Supreme Court's Bulletin, Supreme Court's Bulletin, No. 2, 28 February 2005 
41 Orlova (n 1), p.215  
42 Orlova (n 1), p.215 
43 Supreme Court's Bulletin, Supreme Court's Bulletin, No. 1, 4 February 2005 
44 Orlova (n 1), p.215 
45 Alexandra V. Orlova, ‘Russia's anti-money laundering regime: law enforcement tool or instrument of domestic 
control?’ (2008) 11 Journal of Money Laundering Control 210, p.215 
Russia greatly improved its money laundering law, now allowing for proper combating of 
money laundering. Even though Russia already made great efforts, the international cooperation 
should still be enhanced. Overall, the Russian anti-money laundering regime has proved 
ineffective in terms of meeting its stated purposes of combating organised crime and terrorism. 
The limited success of the Russian anti-money laundering law stems largely from the fact that 
Russian banking system is structurally weak. The other main reason is the lack of regulatory 
compliance culture within the industry, weakening the effect of the law itself. 
 
i. Terrorism: a global problem hard to solve at just national level 
The major effect that the money laundering law had was to amend various existing laws, such 
as the Criminal Code, with the new definition of money laundering, the Banking Law and the 
Securities Market Law, in respect of the new system for reporting suspicious transactions. 
However, all these amendments were implemented in 2002, some of which are no longer 
reflecting the current reality. For instance, barely anything is written in relation to financing 
terrorism through money laundering. One of the reasons for this omission is that at the time the 
laws were amended and the money laundering law was enacted, international terrorism was at 
its starting point. The perception of terrorism changed after the September 11th 2001 attacks.46  
The acts of terrorism perpetrated on September 11th were not, in themselves, the catalysts 
leading to the development of new international laws. In fact, few international conventions 
were adopted post 9/11. However, the September 11th represented the impetuous that hastened 
the scope and reach of international counterterrorism law. The events triggered a new 
determination to ensure strict compliance with existing legislations.47  Furthermore, there is a 
sentiment in Russia, which was until recently shared by numerous countries, that terrorist 
attacks only occur in other countries and that Russia is safe.  
1. Terrorism a global problem  
With regard to money laundering financing terrorism, one of the reasons it is very hard to 
legislate and regulate such an area is that there are no definitions of terrorism at international 
level, and terrorism is no longer restricted to the borders of one country. Terrorism as a global 
phenomenon exists since old days.48 Yet modern day transnational terrorism is emerging as a 
global problem and damaging the monarchical, dictatorial and democratic states.49 The 
coverage by the media of these contemporary acts of terrorism has further broadened the scope 
of its international aspect.50 The complexity and difficulty of the issues cannot be denied; at a 
global level, the issues are different than at national level. International law can help to set up 
a framework, but terms of homeland defence to make the country less vulnerable have to be set 
by each country. The same holds true with regard to intelligence gathering information, criminal 
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investigation, and prosecution. One important point is that terrorism in itself is just a concept, 
not even an ideology. Terrorism is more of a mean or a tactic to pursue ideological or political 
ends.  
The problem is multi-dimensional and multi-layered therefore the response should hold the 
same characteristics. The motives, the size of the attack and the jurisdiction in which it was 
committed, define the scope of terrorist acts as national or international acts.51 An act of 
terrorism at a national level may be a response to national politics whereas international acts of 
terrorism are the purview of the international community to protect international peace, security 
and stability.52 As was recognised by the High-Level Panel, the strategy needs to incorporate 
coercive measures but at the same time, it needs to be broader.  
The lack of a comprehensive international answer to terrorism is not recent. The quest started 
in 1972 with an Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism established by the UNGA to develop 
legislation to prevent terrorism.53 A consensus could not be reached among states. The dividing 
question was whether there was a need to distinguish the acts of terrorism from the national 
liberation movements.54 The US point of view was that all terrorist acts should be condemned 
and objected to differentiate between terrorist acts.55 Without such a consensus, it was 
impossible for the community to draft a definition that would please all the stakeholders 
involved. The community has attempted to define terrorism comprehensively but has not yet 
been successful.56 The lack of a universally acceptable definition of terrorism is a big hurdle in 
devising effective counter terrorism measures. Indeed, in order to prevent and deter terrorism 
in future, the International comity of nations needs to agree upon a universally acceptable 
definition.57  
2. The lack of a uniform definition on terrorism and its impact on 
the development of international law on terrorism financing and 
money laundering  
A consensual definition of terrorism is indispensable in formulating appropriate legislation 
against terrorism.58 Apart from the key motive that drafting a general definition would 
contribute to harmonizing national criminal laws, other benefits might be generated from a 
consensual and general legal definition. For instance, it will help in extraditing terrorists, 
identifying the appropriate evidence necessary for a conviction and it will assist in identifying 
the types of activities likely to result in a terrorism offence. Although there are agreements 
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between states, usually extradition for political reasons, which is the case with terrorism, is 
rejected.59  
Terrorism remains a term that is extremely difficult to define.  Some scholars ask why it is 
absolutely necessary to find a legal definition of the concept. For instance, Baxter says it is 
‘imprecise, ambiguous, and above all it serves no operative purpose’,60 regretting that a legal 
concept of terrorism had been inflicted upon academia. Higgins, another eminent international 
lawyer, observed that ‘terrorism is a term without a legal significance. It is merely a convenient 
way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in 
which either the methods used are unlawful, or the targets protected, or both’.61  Reflecting on 
the above statements, Walter questioned the necessity of finding a legal definition of the 
concept, suggesting that it would be preferable rather to define the criminal acts within 
terrorism.62 Scholars in politics, law, history, psychology, theology and criminology have tried 
and failed to devise a definition of ‘terrorism’.63  There is no agreement on the limits of the 
‘terrorism’ phenomenon.  For analysts, such as Bowel and Ganor, terrorism represents all sorts 
of violence except state violence. Yet, other scholars consider that people who defend a noble 
cause should not be classified as terrorists and, indeed, ought to be regarded as patriots. 64 There 
is no unanimity on what constitutes ‘terrorism.’  
Despite the proliferation of international laws, their assessments and legal frameworks 
concerning terrorism, such as the scholars considered above, these definitions do not yet possess 
what is required of a legal definition. This discussion demonstrates that the difficulties 
surrounding the ability of the international community in agreeing a formal legal definition of 
terrorism but also the profound need to reach such definition. The lack of definition has in part 
frustrated the capacity of international law to address terrorism and preparatory activities at the 
international level.   
However, even without a definition of terrorism, a convention was enacted to deal with 
terrorism financing, namely the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
The Convention requires the contracting states to be proactive in preventing financing 
terrorism. States are obliged to create accountability for the person caught financing terrorism. 
The Convention authorise the states to freeze terrorist funds. It is also the first convention that 
developed a sort of legal definition of terrorism. Indeed, in order to prohibit financing, the 
international community had to give at least a hint of what was terrorism.65 Article 2 (1) (a) 
refers to previous counter-terrorism convention while Article 2 (1) (b) is read as followed:  
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“(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.”  
In criminal law terms, Article 2(1) (b) is addressing the actus reus of a terrorist act and the mens 
rea.66 Article 2(1) (b) could really well be the basis of an international legal definition. Certainly 
so, since the Convention has been ratified by numerous countries. The main element missing in 
Article 2(1)(b) is the identity of the perpetrator, which might mean that the Article could be 
applied to both state and non-state entities. 
3. Russian view on terrorism finance  
Russian regime was changed to avoid excessive reporting by banks and it was established that 
transaction under 30,000 Roubles were excepted of reporting. This measure was criticised as 
many terrorist acts do not require large sums of money for their perpetration. As demonstrated 
above, terrorism is not a simple issue, main reason being the lack of international definition and 
consortium.  
On top of the problem caused by the lack of consortium, a problem is associated with the 
tackling of both the issues of money laundering and terrorist financing within the same regime. 
While detection of money laundering involves criminal origins, monetary resources allocated 
to finance terrorism do not necessarily come from criminal origins. Per se the use of a law for 
two activities that do not have the same origin. The law tries to combat two crimes that are 
distinct with the same rules. “Thus, distinguishing money with "dirty" origins from money 
allocated for "dirty" purposes involves two fundamentally different detection strategies. "Dirty" 
money from organised criminal activity that is conducted as a business will appear differently 
within the financial system than the occasional monies (with sometimes legitimate origins) that 
are dedicated to individual terrorist acts.”67 Methods that are useful for detecting money 
laundering may conflict with methods establishing whether a resource is used for terrorism 
finance purposes.  
As explained above, no consensus exists at international level as to the definition of terrorism 
and modern terrorism does not restrain itself to national borders anymore. It is a global problem 
which needs global measures. This lack of coherence is also visible within the wording of the 
anti-money laundering law itself. Indeed, while Article 6.2 refers to ‘extremist activities’, 
Article 7.10 only refers to ‘terrorist activities’. Although these two terms are frequently used 
interchangeably, these two terms convey slightly different ideas. Indeed, extremist activities 
embody a wider array of crimes. 
The term "extremist activities" is also defined in both section 282.1 of the Criminal Code and 
in Article 1 of the Federal Law On Combating Extremist Activities. In both these provisions, 
the term refers to the commission of various crimes motivated by ideological, political, racial, 
national or religious reasons. Moreover, s. 282.1 lists some of examples of extremist activities, 
which includes demonstration, vandalism, hooliganism, obstruction of the holding or 
participation in an assembly, meeting, procession, or picketing. Of course the incitement of 
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national, racial or religious enmity is included in the list. Surprisingly enough, terrorism is not 
listed in s.282.1 as an extremist activity. However, Article 1 of the Federal Law On Combating 
Extremist Activities stipulates that terrorism is an extremist activity. The Federal Law On 
Combating Extremist Activities was further amended for the definition of extremist activities 
to include public libel of a government official or his family, public statements justifying or 
excusing terrorism.68 
These definitions are so broad that virtually any individual or organisation may be caught in an 
activity falling within the scope of the term extremist activities, certainly so, with the inclusion 
of ideological or political reasons as motives for such activities. The danger of having such a 
broad definition is that individuals or organisations, which are not conducting any activities 
linked to financing terrorism, may be placed on the extremist lists under Article 6.2 of the 
money laundering law. Therefore, it is entirely possible that an opponent of the Russian 
President, will be charged with money laundering offence, as happened with the unregistered 
National Bolshevik Party. This in turn once again shows how the anti-money laundering law 
might have been enacted to pursue other goals. Moreover, “the potential for abuse is quite clear, 
as measures directed against money laundering and terrorist financing are no longer restricted 
to a prescribed set of situations but instead may be employed to combat the nebulous threat of 
"extremism". As succinctly stated by Beknazar (2003): 
[...] [t]he discourse on security in Russia does not clearly distinguish between terrorism and 
other forms of extremism and serious crime. Thus, an amorphous threat emerges from the 
discourse that incorporates concerns about "extremism" (religious and occasionally political), 
"banditry," criminality, general social disorder, and the rupture of national unity. References 
are often made to "the struggle against terror and extremism," rather than the war against 
terrorism.”.69 
ii. Structural weakness of the banking system  
Through the money laundering law, the Russian government tried to reform the banking system. 
This, in turn, weakens the law as it is not its initial purpose. The Russian Central Bank's focus 
is on bureaucratic activity, rather than producing results.70 
1. The problem within the banking system  
The Russian banking system is characterised by a few strong large state-owned banks and many 
small and medium-sized banks.71 Russian banks are either specialised or have a limited 
geographical focus.72 Russian banks are seen as limited geographically as they tend to 
concentrate in wealthier regions, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, leaving other regions with 
a limited number of banks.73 Even though Russia possesses a large amount of banks, very few 
are playing an important role in the Russian economy, as most of them are relatively small 
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without an important capital.74 This, in turns, makes the Russian banking industry weak, 
certainly when Russian major companies prefer to borrow from foreign banks. As a result, 
Russian banks are often left with riskier borrowers.75 On top of that, a distrust in banks has 
emerged in the Russian society, leading to a very low level of household deposits and people 
preferring keeping their savings at home.76 Therefore, Russian banks need to find other sources 
of capital.  
Most of the time, banks rely on few companies or a group of companies as a major source of 
capital, resulting in the companies dictating their ways instead of the banks.77 As a result, banks 
have more of the role of treasury for big corporations rather than banks, as known elsewhere in 
the world.78 This structure has more than one danger, but the main disadvantage that it creates 
is that since the withdrawal of one client can have severe consequences, banks are reluctant to 
report any suspicious behaviour on the side of this client.  
The banking system has already been reformed but banks still struggle to attract a sufficient 
level of small deposit from workers, which would allow them to free themselves from the 
control exercised by major corporations.79 However, these financial institutions are not used to 
deal with smaller investors and therefore, need restructuration which would be a challenge. 
Even the banks which are under state control, such as Sberbank, have problems with 
restructuring. Indeed, this bank was one of the last ones to propose credit cards.80 
However, in 2002, structural reforms of the banking system started with the change in the 
leadership of the Central Bank and the appointment of Andrei Kozlov as the deputy chairman. 
One of the first reforms that was introduced was the creation of a deposit insurance system in 
2003, guaranteeing deposits up to 100,000 Roubles (US$1,500).81 The other significant 
substantive reform was the reform of the framework for prudential supervisions, which was the 
major step taken in order to increase transparency in the sector.82 During this period, measures 
to facilitate the development of specific banking activities were taken. All these reforms had as 
their main goal to increase public confidence in the banking system. Russian government 
understood that to reinstitute trust in the banking system, it had to offer protection to small 
depositors and to try to avoid a similar outcome if a crisis occurred as the outcome of the 1998 
banking crisis in which a large number of small depositors lost all their savings. Moreover, 
another important goal was to increase the choice of the customers by increasing the 
competitiveness of private banks vis-à-vis state banks. One of the measures taken to increase 
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such competitiveness was to encourage private banks to offer more attractive financial 
products.83 
The Central Bank was criticised with regards to the deposit insurance system. The system was 
first put in place only to allow healthy financial institutions within the system, which would 
have allowed to ‘clean’ the banking system of the weaker banks. However, after the mini-
banking crisis of 2004, the Central Bank accepted various institutions that were not considered 
healthy. The deposit insurance system was seen as the chance for the Central Bank to tackle a 
long-lasting problem.84 However, the major failure of the plan was that it was not capable of 
attracting a vast number of small depositors. This should not come as a surprise, as even before 
the system was introduced, state-controlled banks already guaranteed the full amount of the 
deposit but was rejected by the Russian population.85  
Despite the introduction of the deposit insurance system, banks did not become more 
independent and certainly not more competitive.86 The major problem of this type of reform is 
that it has been imposed by the government and does not come from an internal desire of the 
banks to improve and develop their services.87 The banks had never anticipated that compliance 
with money laundering laws would be very expensive.  
 
2. Banking system and money laundering regulation  
The regulation combating money laundering contains complex requirements which makes it 
more difficult for the banks to comply with them. The sanctions imposed in case of failure to 
comply are so small compared to, for instance, the United States. Only few banks lost their 
license in Russia due to money laundering.88 
Another problem, that will be discussed in more detail below, is that the culture of compliance 
is not that strong in Russia. This is exemplified by the fact that during the first years after the 
enactment of the money laundering law, many banks forgot to send any reports to the Federal 
Financial Monitoring Service, for the period of 2001-2004. Further, some of the banks only 
forwarded information when the transaction was subject to mandatory control requirements.89 
With the time passing, the use of the regime started to be smoother. Certainly so as the Central 
Bank issued a number of guiding instructions to help the banks, yet it also increased its 
compliance checks, leading to a drastic change. In order to avoid sanctions from the Central 
Bank, banks started to send more reports on transactions under mandatory control but also on 
suspicious transactions. 90 This compulsive reporting causes problem as the banks, by fear of 
sanctions, prefer reporting transaction regardless of whether there is any substantive possibility 
that such transactions may be connected to money laundering or terrorist financing. This in turn 
leads to the Federal Financial Monitoring Service (Russia's Financial Intelligence Unit) to be 
flooded with information. As a result, certain features of the regime have been altered in an 
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attempt to ease the burden on the banks. For example, one of the reforms is that banks are no 
longer required to conduct client or beneficiary identification if the transaction does not exceed 
30,000 Roubles (US$500).91 This measure was critised as many terrorist acts do not require 
large sums of money for their perpetration. 
 
3. How to ameliorate this system and the lack banks that are Sharia 
compliant.  
Russian economy has suffered from the numerous international sanctions that it has been fined 
with. Indeed, after President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in March 
2015, sanctions were imposed by the U.S, leading the world’s biggest energy exporter on the 
edge of recession. Following these sanctions, Moody’s Investors Service cut Russia’s credit 
rating a bit further. The restricted access to international capital markets of Russia does not help 
to solve the problem. The key point is to restore the trust of small investors in banks, in order 
to avoid the control of the banks by large corporations. But, also to attract foreign investments 
as Russian ones are no more enough.   
Russia has planned on opening its first Islamic bank in 2015 in order to attract Sharia-complaint 
funds. Russia had to pass a specific law to allow Islamic banking, aiming at attracting capital 
from Islamic countries. But some fears that such Sharia-compliant bank will not comply with 
anti-money laundering laws.  
iii. Lack of compliance culture  
The money laundering law requires financial institutions to scrutinize and report any suspicious 
activities. On top of that financial institutions should not allow customers to open or keep 
anonymous bank account. But since compliance with the law is no within the industry culture 
and often large sums of money are involved, financial institutions prefer closing their eyes. 
Even though there is a compliance obligation in the law, no mechanisms were put in place, 
within the law, to punish an infringement of such obligation.  
Another reason for keeping money out of banks for small depositors, despite the deposit 
insurance system, is tax avoidance, which remains widespread.92 Other compliance issues faced 
by Russian banks concern procedures for verifying the identities of their customers as well as 
identifying beneficiaries of transactions. This type of procedures results in an increase in the 
cost of banking services, which deter small businesses and average persons to deposit money.  
As is emphasized by Levi and Reuter: “[...] part of the resistance to [the anti-money laundering 
measures] comes from the emotional and practical experiences of ordinary citizens who may 
find it difficult to open accounts because they lack the identification documents in their own 
names required by the money-laundering regulations, even though their intended business is 
small and not remotely connected to the transnational crime activity [...].”93 
The cash economy is prevalent in Russia, creating a great obstacle to bank compliance. Indeed, 
partially due to the lack of trust in the banking system, many deals are still done in cash. This 
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in turns makes it very difficult for banks to detect when money with illicit origins is used in a 
transaction. Moreover, this cash economy leads to a high demand of cash on the side of the 
clients. Companies often use cash to pay the “grey” salaries to employees in order to avoid 
taxation requirements, as it is common practice for companies to underreport profits and salaries 
paid.94 Many companies still lack transparency, making it difficult for the banks to identify the 
owners and beneficiaries of various transactions undertaken by these companies. 
Bribery of state officials is another common practice in order to acquire lucrative contracts, 
even though this last few years this practice is diminishing.95 This cash economy is very useful 
for money laundering, as the cash withdrawal is often the final stage of the laundering process, 
with this cash being reintroduced into the legitimate economy. Furthermore, this cash 
withdrawal can be then directed to finance terrorist operations. “Banks are forced to dole out 
stacks of rubles to keep their customers satisfied".96 This cash economy leaves smaller banks 
with relatively small capitalization and dependence on few important clients, making this banks 
particularly vulnerable to money laundering. As these banks are subject to the requirements of 
the anti-money laundering legislation, but they are also very reluctant to generate reports on 
transactions made to their best and most influential customers. This tension between the 
requirements of anti-money laundering legislation and clients’ demands has its roots in a much 
deeper problem that concerns the conflicting roles in which banks find themselves as a result 
of the imposition of the anti-money laundering regime. Banks have two roles that are not easily 
reconcilable, namely their role as profit makers and their role as law enforcer.  
The effect of the money laundering legislation are minimal, as the compliance culture in Russia 
is not well developed. As Alexandra Orlova put it: “Given the problems of compliance 
experienced by the banking industry, the ability of Russia's anti-money laundering regime to 
disrupt organized criminal activities and to prevent the financing of terrorism is suspect”.97 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper has sought to demonstrate the current challenge Russia faces with regard to money 
laundering. The law is vague and leaves a lot of room to the monitoring authorities, and shows 
that the government did follow another agenda while enacting this law. This paper tried to show 
the reasons that lies beneath the rhetoric used to establish an anti-money laundering regime in 
Russia.  
In Russia, the problems of compliance disrupt the effect that the anti-money laundering regime 
could have in preventing financing of terrorism and money laundering. Certainly so as courts 
are not concentrating on professional launderers or organized criminal entities but rather on 
self-laundering. However, self-laundering is a ‘disease’ that exists not only in Russia but also 
in the US for instance. The other important problem with this approach is that charge of self-
laundering is overwhelmingly used against persons that are already condemned for other (small) 
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criminal offences. Often self-laundering transaction are no more sophisticated than depositing 
money in a bank or conveying property. These prosecutions do not concentrate on third-party 
launderers or leaders of organized criminal entities.  
The Russian government complied with the FATF standards in order to stay away from the 
‘black list’ but also to use them as a tool to modernize the Russian banking system. This practice 
is not just done in Russia. Indeed, even in the USA, where the FATF is born, “the rhetoric used 
to justify the anti-money laundering regime and the realities of the regime's usage do differ 
significantly”.98 This rhetoric is exemplified in Article 1 of the federal anti-money laundering 
legislation which establishes the aim of the law as to create "a legal mechanism to counteract 
the legalization (laundering) of incomes obtained by in self-laundering criminal means and the 
financing of terrorism". In the eyes of the Russian Supreme Court, prosecutions for money 
laundering are disrupting the financial base of organized crime and terrorism. Obviously, there 
is inconsistencies between he stated goals of the money laundering regime and the realities of 
the courts', banks' and Central Bank's practices. This in turn can make one ask the real reasons 
of the implementation of the money laundering regulations and what are the goals that such 
regulations try to achieve in the Russian context. Certainly, when evidence suggests that the 
anti-money laundering regime is being used to pursue domestic political objectives quite 
unrelated to combating organized crime and terrorism.99 Specifically, these objectives relate to 
reforming the banking industry and controlling the business community and political activists.  
This political control is well highlighted with the extensive use made of Article 13 of the anti-
money laundering law. Article 13 provides as a penalty, the revocation of the license if a bank 
is found in violation of certain provisions of the money laundering law. “Between the years 
2004 and 2006, approximately 70 Russian banks had their licenses withdrawn due to violating 
these provisions”. 100 Even though it was ten years ago, the situation has hardly changed. 
Furthermore, it proves that the law was probably passed to pursue unrelated aims. Although it 
has never been proven, rumors have circulated in 2005, that in fact the Central Bank was 
pursuing an agenda of its own and was withdrawing the license of banks it listed as weak. 101 
These speculations have led the population to even more distrust Russian banks than it already 
did before.  
In both countries the problem is systemic and existed long before the money laundering law. 
However, some poor choices have led to lowering the confidence of the small investors, that 
was already quasi inexistent, in Russia. The response of the Russian government to this crisis 
and loss of confidence was to expend the deposit insurance plan to private banks as until then 
it was only available for state-sponsored banks. The deposit insurance scheme’s main aim was 
to re-establish popular trust in the bank, but it failed to do so. Furthermore, dealing with 
terrorism together with money laundering in one single piece of legislation is not the smartest 
choice as these two problems have different roots and are conducted in different ways. But as 
explained also, no consensus exists at international level as to the definition of terrorism and 
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modern terrorism is everything except national. It is a global problem which needs global 
measures. This lack of coherence is also visible within the wording of the anti-money 
laundering law itself. Indeed, while Article 6.2 refers to ‘extremist activities’, Article 7.10 only 
refers to ‘terrorist activities’. Although these two terms are frequently used interchangeably, 
these two terms convey slightly different ideas. Indeed, extremist activities embody a wider 
array of crimes. Finally, the Russian banking system is weak and need reforms that are in no 
sense political but are made to cure the problems of the system itself.  
Money laundering legislation has been used to send a strong signal to the business community 
in Russia that any actions against Putin's objective of re-establishing governmental control over 
important areas of the economy which would also help building a strong centralized state, will 
be prosecuted.  
 
